ناسیونالیسم و مارکسیسم- بخش چهارم و پایانی

ناسیونالیسم و مارکسیسم- بخش چهارم و پایانی

Notes
1. For their helpful comments and suggestions on various aspects of this
chapter I am indebted to Rob Ryan, Colin Hay. Alan Hunt, Charles
Lepage, Valeric Peters and Tony Tant. Of course, the usual C�lVeats
apply.
2. Whilst Marx is frequently, and correctly, called to task for this chauvin�
ism, it was onc that was widely shared among nineteenth century
European thinkers, from Hegel to 1. S. Mill.
3. Whilst Engels focused particularly upon the ‘minor Slav peoples’ – Serbs,
Slovaks, Czechs, Croats and so on – he does, in passing, include in this
category of ‘history-less national refuse’ the Gaels of Scotland, the
Brelons of France, the Basques of Spain and the pan-Slav South Slavs
(Engels, 1 849b, 221�2).
4. See particularly Rosdolsky (1980).
5. In addition to the contributions surveyed here, Kautsky, Bernstein,
Trotsky, Pannekoek, Strasser and Connolly, amongst others, would also
make significant interventions.
6. This assumption was not limited to Lenin and Stalin, or to Marxists,
Even much of today’s literature in this area starts from precisely this
premise (ef. Gellner, 1983; Giddens, 1981; 1985; Greenfeld, 1992).
7. Most notably, Karl Renner (1978). For useful discussions of Renner’s
contribution to these debates, see Kolakowski ( 1978) and Bottomore and
Goode (1978).
8. Traces of both of these resonate strongly in the work of Ernst Renan
(1990), whilst the ‘will to nation’ (nation defined by the conscious
solidarity of national agents) lies at the heart of Max Weber’s conceptualization (1968).
9. Stalin was particularly scathing in his attacks on Bauer for these reasons.
For a recent critique in a similarly orthodox vein, see Blaut (1987,
pp. 59�62)
10. Most notably, Rosdolsky (1 980), Davis (1 967; 1978), Haupl el al. (1974)
and Lowy (1976).
1]. Nimni’s formulations draw heavily on the work of Laclau and MoufTe
(cf. Laclau and MOliffe, 1985).
12. For a powerful epistemological and methodological critique of the Oaws
inherent in assuming the unity of ‘the oeuvre’. see Foucault (1972,
pp. 21�30).
13. Whilst ‘much can and has been made of Marx and Engels’ ethnocentrism
and the dominance in their work of an ideology of progress, neither
detailing the doctrine of “history less” people nor debating whether or
not Man and Engels -were latent racists will take us very far in under�
standing the limitations of their theory of the nation’ (lames, 1993:
p. 177). Indeed, without making excuses for some of their excessive
language, it should be noted that the underpinnings of Marx and Engels’
great-nations chauvinism lay not in some immanent conception of
inherent racial�cum-ethnic superiority (or anything of the sort), but
rather in a profoundly underdeveloped teleological conception of the
nalion, onc borrowed uncritically from Hegel (cf. Balakrishnan, 1995,
p. 60).
14. Here Hobsbawm’s work intersects elements of the broader literature
dealing with the role of collective memory in the constitution of the
nation. As Renan pointed Out, the nation is as much about forgetting as
it is about remembering (Renan, 1882, p. 1 J). But where others highlight
the selective and partial nature of ‘ national memory’, the thesis of
invented traditions highlights the way novel themes, symbols and
practices are appropriated and consolidated in the constitution of
national identity.
15. We might note here important dimensions of Scottish nationalism
(McCrone, 1992), the numerous indigenous peoples’ national movements
(Jcnson. 1993: Purvis, 1995) and many Third World and minority
nationalisms (Lowy, 1993).
16. Compare, for instance, the crude evolutionism driving .Ernest Gellner’s
(1983) conception of the nation with the more conjuncturally sensitive
treatments of the issue by Pouialltzas (1978b), Anderson (1991) and
Hobsbawm and Ranger ( 1992).